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1  Introduction 
The overall objective of the Marie Curie Research Training Network Multi-level Governance of 
Natural Resources: Tools and Processes for Water and Biodiversity Governance in Europe 
(GoverNat) is to develop new solutions for multi-level environmental governance and to 
facilitate their use by decision makers in an enlarged EU. Research to be conducted by the 
GoverNat fellows tests the general hypothesis that certain participatory processes and analytical 
decision tools are useful for improving multi-level environmental governance. The central 
training objective of GoverNat is to give 9 doctoral and 3 post-doctoral fellows an 
interdisciplinary training in 1) research on multilevel environmental governance, particularly of 
biodiversity and water, in Europe, and 2) designing legitimate and effective solutions for 
participation and communication between the policy makers, scientists, and other involved and 
affected parties. 
 
The methodological novelty of GoverNat lies in combining (1) multidisciplinary training, (2) 
interdisciplinary research, (3) transdisciplinary case studies, and (4) an integration of these three 
elements. GoverNat's analytical framework will be used as a starting point by all GoverNat 
fellows. The framework guides analysis to systematical characterization and assessment of 
experiences in multi-level governance of water and biodiversity by combining concepts from 
economics, political and legal sciences, as well as from ecology, hydrology, philosophy and 
sociology. A tentative version of shared framework was drafted as a part of the process of 
developing proposal and work programme for GoverNat.  
 
The central task of GoverNat’s Work Package 1, Analysing Multilevel Water and Biodiversity 
Governance in their Context, was to elaborate the analytical framework and to ensure that 
GoverNat research focuses on issues that are perceived to be of highest value added in terms of 
policy significance and academic merit. The work package has been lead by the Sustainability 
Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, but all GoverNat 
partners have contributed to the development of analytical framework. This document reports on 
the activities conducted as part of the Work Package 1, and describes the revisions to the draft 
framework that are warranted in the light of the completed activities. 
 
The Description of Work identified the following specific tasks of WP1: 
1.  Analysing the specific research context of governance of natural resources. This task was 
undertaken by senior scholars of the GoverNat partnership. It involved the preparation of 3 
framework papers that examined the key aspects of the research problematic on the basis of 
most recent academic literature. 
2.  In-depth interviews with scientists, stakeholders and decision makers involved in past cases. 
This task was undertaken as a series of consultations with participants of environmental 
governance processes. The task was completed by the GoverNat early stage and experienced 
fellows under the supervision of senior scholars.  
3.  Comparing specifics along the analysis framework. This task was undertaken by all senior 
partners in the context of the Leeds and Lisbon Schools and Workshops, and by the 
Sustainability Research Institute team in conjunction with the writing of this report. 
4.  Report on governance of natural resources in two new member states in Central Eastern 
Europe (CEE) (referred to as ‘CEE report’). This task was undertaken as a review of most 
recent published and grey literature complemented by personal consultations by the Institute 
for Forecasting, Slovak Academy of Sciences, and IREAS. 
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5.  Insert analysis knowledge for project integration (month 34-40). This task will be undertaken 




In what follows, the next section will report on the key conceptual implications for the analysis 
of multi-level governance of natural resources that have arisen from the preparation of 
framework papers. The third section then reports on the results of the consultation process and 
the survey of experiences in the CEE countries. The fourth section will discuss the implications 
of the results of tasks 1 to 5 to the analytical framework of GoverNat. The fifth section outlines 
the research programme that emerges from the individual research projects of the GoverNat 
fellows. The final section identifies the implications of the tasks for the future training 
programme of the GoverNat. 
2  Multi-level governance of natural resources 
Environmental governance is in many ways a concept not unlike ‘sustainable development’: it 
means different things for different people. For some, governance in general refers to new ways 
of achieving social objectives in which states do participate but do not necessarily play a leading 
role (e.g. Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998). To others, environmental governance relates to all 
institutional attempts for addressing environmental dilemmas (Davidson and Frickel 2004; 
Paavola 2007). The World Bank defines governance as ‘the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which 
those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to 
effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them’ 
(World Bank, 2008). However, governance today moves beyond the concentration of the formal 
institutions and policy making processes of states and governments which is emphasised in the 
World Bank’s definition. Therefore, environmental governance now includes private partners 
and civil society, including NGOs and shows a multi-level reallocation of powers both upwards 
to supranational organisations and downwards to sub-national levels (Bache and Flinders 2004). 
 
Whichever standpoint towards environmental governance is adopted, one observation is clear: in 
the past several decades, the range of institutional measures used in Europe for environmental 
governance has broadened, and as a result the institutional framework for environmental 
governance has both thickened and become more complex (Jordan 1999). Given the inflationary 
use (Watson 2005) and multiple interpretations (Kjær 2004) of the term governance, we refer 
here by environmental governance mainly to the establishment and implementation of EU 
policies in the union and the member states. 
 
A key contribution of the political science literature to research on environmental governance is 
a distinction between specific governance interventions or ‘governance frameworks’, and 
broader ‘governance regimes’ which encompass all rules and norms that steer governance 
actions. For example, the Birds Directive and Habitats Directive are institutional frameworks for 
the governance of biodiversity in Europe, but governance regimes for biodiversity in Europe 
include far greater number of formal and informal institutions. These range from international 
conventions such as CITES to Water Framework Directive and Common Agricultural Policy of 
the European Union to cultural customs specific to sub-regions in member states (e.g. Baker 
2003). This distinction acknowledges the ubiquitous interplay between different sets of 
institutions and reminds us of multiple causation of governance outputs, impacts and outcomes.  
 
The EU definition of governance indicates what good governance should look like rather than 
who is involved and how, thereby leaving the implementation open for multiple solutions: 
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‘governance means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are 
exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence’ (European Commission 2001). In general terms, governance occurs 
in three broad ways, which can be combined in any particular set-up:  
1.  top-down methods that primarily involve governments and the state bureaucracy;  
2.  the use of market mechanisms whereby market principles of competition serve to allocate 
resources while operating under government regulation;  
3.  networks involving public-private partnerships (PPP) or with the collaboration of community 
organisations (adapted from Thompson et al. 1990) .    
 
With regard to the question of how institutions and mechanisms of governance come into being 
there is the implicit assumption of an overarching organising power (the state, the market or 
evolution) that puts them in place. If this assumption is questioned, an additional dimension of 
governance is opened up: political processes of rule making. Governance then includes the 
creation, maintenance and transformation of social forms of organisation through interventions 
in and modulation of existing patterns of interaction. These rule shaping processes (e.g. public 
policy or organisational management) are institutionally structured themselves (Voβ 2007).  
 
These findings highlight the importance of considering the broader governance regime for 
biodiversity and not just the key EU directives on biodiversity. Conflicts in a number of member 
states over site designations in the 1990s had in part to do with a governance practice which 
omitted the relevance of institutions other than the Habitats Directive and Birds Directive, as 
well as the effect of markets. Markets generate development pressures which compete with 
preservation interests over space, something which was at the root of a conflict over the 
designation of the Humber Estuary in the UK, for example (Gibbs et al. 2007). These conflicts 
also highlighted the central role of scales in environmental governance. The narrow governance 
frameworks put in place were adopted at a European level and involved a one-way, top-down 
implementation process. Failure to engage multiple levels was another reason for the ensuing 
conflicts. The implementation experience to date suggests that multiple scales have gradually 
become engaged and that this has also brought into play a broader range of institutions that have 
de facto impact on the governance of biodiversity in Europe. This is why GoverNat explicitly 
deals with multi-level governance (MLG).  
 
Water and biodiversity governance present challenges in common with multi-level governance 
of other natural resources: 
1.  high levels of uncertainty in these complex natural and social processes; 
2.  legitimacy of adopted institutional processes and of their consequences; 
3.  new modes of governance generate social dynamics; 
4.  costs of governance processes, policy implementation, and failed decisions. 
 
As indicated above, they are also characterised by interdependence across spatial scales and by 
interactions with other policy fields (on vertical and horizontal interplay, see Figure 1).  
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As a consequence of these challenges, traditional disciplinary approaches and regulatory 
decision making can only suggest partial solutions for governance. For example, the economic 
theory of federalism sheds light on the optimal level of decision making and the theory of 
welfare economics provides estimates of the costs of different measures. However, these 
economic approaches ignore legal and social justice implications of nested decision procedures 
in multilevel governance. Recent political science theories analyse joint decision making, but 
they fail to identify improvements to current practices that would address the four challenges 
identified above. Networked governance (Jordan et al. 2003; Jordan and Schout 2006; 
Williamson 1979 and 1991; Stoker 1998; Jones et al. 1997; Goodwin 1998; Gulati 1998), 
heterarchic governance (Pülzl and Rametsteiner 2002), meta-governance (Jessop 2002 and 
2004), and other new forms of governance demand co-ordination between policies, the public 
and science. Moreover, governance processes are highly complex and encompass different and 
interwoven levels (Heinelt et al. 2002).  
 
As a consequence, of these developments, the analysis of governance requires contributions from 
several disciplines. Only an interdisciplinary approach integrating e.g. institutional economics, 
natural and political sciences, law, sociology and philosophy can generate a break-through in 
research and improve multi-level governance of natural resources. GoverNat aims to contribute 
to this break-through by studying MLG processes as they are taking place in real-life settings in 
Europe. 
3  Consultations and CEE report 
In order to ground the GoverNat research on MLG practice, and thereby to improve its 
relevance, consultations with key informants in water and biodiversity governance were carried 
out at the start of the project (WP1 task 2). Consultations with key informants highlighted issues 
where administrations have difficulties implementing water and biodiversity policies, in 
particular the relevant EU Directives: the Water Framework Directive, the Habitats Directive and 
the Birds Directive. The latter form the legal basis for the Natura 2000 network of protected 
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he following insights were thus derived mostly by ‘reading between the lines’ of 
                                                
areas  addition, an in-depth study of multi-level g
Republic was carried out (WP1 task 4). 
3.1  Data collection and analysis 
Consultations with key informants in water and biodiversity governan
GoverNat early stage and experienced fellows under the supervision of senior scholars. 
Consultations took the format of semi-structured interviews following the guidelines distributed 
to all researchers (Appendix 1). Consultation questions focused on:  
−  positive and negative personal experiences of consultees regar
governance. More specifically, the questions probed the multi-level nature of the experience
problems, interactions and conflicts between levels, views on the current priorities and 
challenges, and views on the future priorities and challenges. 
−
particular, the questions probed who in the opinion of consultees had participated and to 
which degree, and whether that participation had been useful in their opinion.  
 
A total of 49 interviews were carried out. The majority of consultees worked in different parts of 
public administration, many for an NGO, and some in academia. No members of the general 
public or their representatives were interviewed, nor employees of private companies
1. 
interviews were carried out in the fellows’ country of origin or residence, including in the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, the Slovak Re
Spain and the United Kingdom. Most consultations comprised a general discussion on 
participa
s
especially with the implementation of water and biodiversity policies at the local and regional 
levels.  
 
The data for the in-depth study of multi-level environmental governance issues in Poland and
Czech Republic was collected by the GoverNat partners in the Institute of Forecasting, Slovak 
Academy of Sciences, and IREAS as a desk-study relying primarily on secondary data suc
academic literature and other publications, project documents, and internet resources. A few 
experts were also consulted in order to access internal publications or statistics. The ch
countries was motivated by their relatively similar resource characteristics but distinctive 
historical development of institutions for biodiversity management. Data collection was ba
a list of general guidelines and research questions. They were aimed at analyzing the 
determinants, effects, and processes of institutional change in the two case study coun
demo atization, decentralization, market emergence, and E
the period from 1990 to present with a short summary of the situation prior to 1989. 
3.2  Findings from consultations 
Fact finding tasks such as the WP1 consultations cannot distinguish between a genuine problem
and the opinion of the respondent of the problem. The way a problem is seen is shaped by 
beliefs, engrained patterns of behaviour, world views, roles in decision-making processes, 
culture and so on. While consultees clearly do have different views on MLG and participation, 
they do not often say explicitly what they mean by participation (in terms of who is involved and
how are they involved) or how they think it ought to take place (who should be involved and in 
what manner). T
 
1 although some state forestry organisations operate with the logic of a private company   
 GoverNat 
 
8 of 27 
is is a first step in understanding the actors and in attributing 
ulture and 
LG. Differences in 
rchal or egalitarian nature; 








nment of goals. While legal rights to be consulted and to file complaints give 
possibilities for the involvement to non-state actors, the costs of legal action can be prohibitive, 





participation mentioned above. Most interviewees used these understandings of participation 
the summaries of consultations. Th
meaning to this understanding: the art of interpretation is unavoidable in social science research 
(Weber 1949). 
3.2.1  Culture and institutions  
From consultation reports it can be concluded that national, and sometimes regional, c
history play an important role in explaining MLG and participation in M
culture and history concerning MLG are related for example to:  
−  general governance culture, e.g. its predominantly hiera
−
−  dominant views on appropriate level of civil society involvement; 
−  discourse on public participation, e.g. framing it as ‘cooperation’ rather than as 
‘participation’, which shapes the perceptions of M
 
These general aspects of environmental governance could perhaps be summarised as ‘deci
making culture’. Typically the scholarship distinguishes between adversarial, fiduciary, 
consensual and corporatist decision making cultures. 
 
The impact of existing organisational structures on MLG was also highlighted in the 
consultations. For example, the additional administrative layer in the Federal Republic of 
Germany creates additional challenges for water governance. The federal level is responsible for
reporting to the EU, but the states have to incorporate the Directives in their law, and they have 
done this in different ways. This makes it more difficult for the NGOs to share procedural 
information on how to respond to administrative requests. Fo
that coordination within one river basin is more complicated and raises problems resembling 
international transboundary basin issues. Cooperation across international borders also bec
more difficult when there are no comparable structures on the other side of the border. This i
reality between the Netherlands and Germany, for example. 
 
Some legal barriers to successful water and biodiversity governance were also identified. 
Depending on the country, these consist of 1) limited possibilities for legally binding 
agreements, 2) legal rights and obligations dominating choices to the exclusion of voluntary 
involvement, and 3) the need to change existing mind sets. The second barrier is relevant for 
example in the Netherlands, where national procedures require proof of effort but EU Directive
requires attai
and they often fail because of for
especially when formal complains need to be underpinned by detailed and extensive technical 
documents.  
3.2.2  Participation in MLG  
The term ‘participation’ can include the participation of everyone who is contributing in any way 
to MLG, such as actors from different sectors and levels of public administration, private 
companies, NGOs, representatives of the general public, and the so-called stakeholders. In a 
narrower sense participation is often interpreted as ‘public participation’ or the participation o
‘the general public’, ‘the people’ or ‘citizens’. In another way, participation can be interpreted
“stakeholder participation”. Here it needs to be clear what stakeholder means. For example, i
the broadest interpretation of stakeholders, as those individual and non-individual actors 
influencing and concerned by a decision, stakeholder participation can be the same as publ
 GoverNat 
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s of full 
e 
rs. 
gst the consultees that it 
 the easiest to involve the public at the local level, because people are interested in 
ase the quality and legitimacy of 
decisions. However, even with this kind of positive attitude towards involving the general public, 




public sector had a rather negative attitude 
towards the NGOs, considering them too forceful and single-issue oriented. However, the 
f NGOs is also appreciated, especially in their role as intermediaries between the 
t 
anies. 
These are actors are seen to be effective and influential lobbyists. They are considered to have 
 bypassing organised participatory processes if they 
interchangeably, but tended to emphasise their interactions with other public agencies and 
powerful organised stakeholders as this takes up most of their time and energy. Therefore
categories, as none o
these groups brings its own problems when they are included in a participatory process. 
The general public  
According to the consultation reports, the involvement of the general public in natural resource 
management is often limited to receiving information or helping to implement plans e.g. b
cleaning up a river, even when procedures are in place for deeper involvement. Some of the 
consultees believe that public agencies are already democratically legitimized. Therefore, t
act in the public interests and do not need to involve the public in their decision making, 
although they might use participatory processes to facilitate data collection. For other consultees, 
members of the general public are unsuitable as participants because they do not have the 
necessary technical skills and knowledge. These views can reflect the lack of political will to
engage in more extensive participatory processes, but they can also reflect actual demand
participation in some contexts. Other consultees recognise that especially at the local level th
general public can contribute to better and more legitimate decisions. Local projects may be 
small in scope but they result in something concrete and help to engage the local acto
Appealing to the emotional ties people have with their environment is seen as way to start a 
participatory process at the local level. There was a general feeling amon
is
developments that affect their lives directly. Specifically, the WFD river basins were identified 
as being too large to generate a general public interest for participation. 
 
Generally it was felt that involving the public directly will incre
difficul
that there is a need to improve existent participatory processes. 
NGOs 
Representatives of the NGOs amongst the consultees consider that they have insufficient human 
resources and knowledge to participate effectively. On the other hand, they also consider 
themselves to have a privileged position because their views are sought by the public au
and because they can exert influence by working together as NGOs. In order to be able to a
effectively, they need to be aware of the alternatives that have not been presented. The NG
feel that frequently they are not able to obtain the required level of information absent 
alternatives. Some consultees representing the 
participation o
public administration and the general public.  
Stakeholders  
Strictly speaking, all participants in a participatory process have a stake in its outcome, not leas
the organisers of the process, but the term ‘stakeholder’ is often used in a narrower sense to refer 
to organised interests such as water companies, private landowners and forestry comp
the capacity to obtain favorable solutions by
feel they need to. This can also be a problem for water and biodiversity governance. 
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ise that organising a participatory process requires special skills and financial 
sources, both of which are often lacking in government bodies. The consultees also find a more 
 
 
l needs but others think that it does not recognise different realities when 
it imposes general rules applicable to all member states. While the whole current administrative 
p d  between levels and 
3.2.3  Horizontal and vertical interplay  
Interestingly, the consultees representing public administration reported that they experience 
frequent difficulties when working with other sectors or levels of public administration. This 
situation arises because there is a need to integrate several (competing) agencies and authorities 
within a state when addressing specific environmental issues. One significant aspect of state-
oriented decision making cultures is the dominance of intra-administrative concerns – this was 
highlighted by consultations with civil servants (see also horizontal interplay in Fig
views highlight the problems that arise as a result of a lack of coordination between different 
policies. In particular, the implementation of water and biodiversity policies is often in conflict 
w
implementation reaches the local level where concrete decisions have to be made. The consultees
consider intra-administrative issues as important barriers to water and biodiversity governance
 
Power relations between levels of public administration are another source of difficulties for t
implementation of the EU directives (vertical interplay, Figure 1). A ministry could refu
fund regionally agreed solutions because the hierarchal decision making procedures were no
adhered to, or the implementation of regional water bodies might be blocked by national a
m
consultees also indicate that sometimes powerful stakeholders successfully bypass existing 
participatory processes and directly lobby decision makers in order to influence choices. 
 
As well as having to compete with other policies, the interviewees also mention as an obstacle 
the lack of implementation of existing natural resources management provisions, for exam
those on agricultural pollution, illegal abstraction or logging. The failure to implement existin
regulations and provisions may be due to a lack of political will. Lack of political will may also
manifest as a denial to fund environmental organizations or actors. For example, the new 
Portuguese regional water bodies are not funded by the central government and need to raise 
money from water tariffs instead. The implementation of water tariffs is in turn blocked by the 
municipalities who are traditionally powerful actors in water resources management. This leaves
the new water bodies without financial means to fulfil their legal obligations. Lack of funds for 
compensatory payments is also indicated as a barrier to biodiversity conservation. Finally, many 
consultees recogn
re
profound problem with the applicability and acceptability of different participatory approaches to
different actors.  
 
Comments about the influence of the EU regulation on the national level suggest that European 
directives are a major driver of national action both technically, e.g. to increase monitoring, as 
well as procedurally, e.g. to increase participation. However, EU directives can also have 
negative effects if they are less strict than the existing national regulations, or if EU subsidies are
made available even when EU regulations are not complied with. In terms of integration of the 
EU directives with existing national regulation, policies and customs, some consultees find the 
WFD adaptable to loca
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arkets for MLG were often not 
 
at the mismatch between the old 
hierarchical institutions developed under socialism and the new, market-oriented bottom-up 
decentralized institutions still persists. However, integration empowered self-government at the 
                                                
3.3  CEE report:  MLG in Poland and Czech Republic
2  
Institutional changes in the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe since the 
late 1980´s have amounted to massive political, economic and social changes. The two most 
important institutional change processes in the CEE countries are the transformation and the E
accession. Transformation started in the late 1980´s and is still ongoing. It can be understood a
ixed process o m
of previous socialistic institutions such as informal rules or shared mental models. EU accessio
is the process of legal harmonization with the existing EU regulations. As this is a relatively 
recent process, its impacts cannot be reasonably assessed yet. The longer process of 
transformation is analysed here to outline the background of MLG of natural resources in the 
CEE countries. 
 
Transformation cannot be viewed solely as the replacement of the existing system with a n
one, but should rather be considered a recombination of elements of the old and new system. 
transition involves not the imposition of a blueprint on a ‘blank’ social and economic space, b
 reworking of institutions of central plannin a
involved in transformation are democratization, decentralization and the emergence of marke
With respect to democratization and the emergence of markets, privatization is the most 
significant institutional change. It has been suggested that, in the CEE countries, political 
objectives were fundamental for undertaking privatization (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn 2002) 
rather than efficiency and competitiveness.  
 
Privatization transformed previously collective or state property to private property without 
appropriate links to the new governance structures. Shared mental models of socialism were n
capable to function, adapt or evolve into new institutions. The governments in several CEE 
countries failed to manage natural resources effectively and created de jure state property but de 
facto open access which resulted in free-riding, over-exploitation and resource depletion (Ostrom 
1990). Private owners do not have incentives to sustainable behaviours and other factors also 
hamper the performance of institutional solutions and challenge robust governance of natural 
esources (Kluvankova and Chobotova 20 r
country. In Poland, small private farms existed prior to 1989 and new environmental governan
could be built on the previously existing structures and skills in market transactions. In the Cz
Republic, national parks were largely established after 1990 and protected areas were exclud
from privatization. In the Czech Republic, the process of transformation largely built on pre
socialist institutions and mental models. 
 
In summary, although some elements of MLG existed both in the Polish and Czech National 
Parks’ management prior to the EU integration, they have not been fully established yet. In 
articular, privatization and the increasing importance of m p
accompanied by adequate monitoring and sanctioning arrangements. In addition, in both 
countries the influence of environmental NGOs in decision-making is very low. The two 
countries have also some differences. In Poland, governance is rather hierarchical and 
jurisdictions are of a general purpose. In the Czech Republic, jurisdictions are more task-specific
and decision making includes a higher number of actors.  
 
In both countries, decentralization and the increasing role of non-state actors result in cross-scale 
coordination and information problems. It can be concluded th
 
2 This section is taken from Banaszak et al. 2008 
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er hand, while their 
ctions are important for MLG, there is a danger that the points of views of NGOs, private 
ings and 
n 
f policy implementation. Understanding these conflicting views on participation in a 
specific setting is a prerequisite for the study of success and failure of the participatory 
procedures and techniques that are employed, because it helps to explain practical problems as 
ken account of in the case 
visited 
 were also prepared by the 
 Andrew 
-Oravska and Jouni Paavola;  
.  Outcome-oriented vs. procedural governance assessment in European governance of natural 
in Renn.  
lowe vels. Although so far local actors and arrangements
making, it can be expected that they will become more visible in the future as they acquire more 
information and experience in the new governance processes. 
3.4  Implications for GoverNat research 
Findings of the consultations and the CEE report suggest a few broad methodological lessons fo
the GoverNat research programme. First, there is a need to increase attention to the cultural and
historical embedding of multi-level environmental governance in the common GoverNat 
framework. This issue is particularly highlighted by the CEE report. Formerly socialist cou
h
processes. Yet these new approaches and processes acquire their meaning and effectiv
the unique historical and cultural contexts of CEE countries. However, consultations also 
suggested that culture influences choices regarding MLG in other member states as well.  
 
Government organisations and their power relations are important issues both in the 
consultations as well as in the CEE report. This highlights that an understanding of the political 
scene is essential for the future GoverNat research on MLG. Understanding participation in/and
MLG requires analysis of the dynamism in the relationships between actors, especially between
the state actors and powerful stakeholders. Consultations suggest that much of the negotiation 
and power play takes place at the more diffuse and less accessible levels of regional and nat
politics. Therefore, GoverNat should specifically aim at studying these levels, and interactions 
between them and other levels, and not limit itself to local level concrete projects. The easiest 
entry points for case studies appear to be government agencies. On the oth
a
companies, other non-governmental stakeholders and the general public do not receive sufficient 
attention. Therefore, GoverNat research should make concerted effort at maintaining a broad 
focus encompassing the viewpoints of different actors involved in MLG. 
 
Lastly, but not least importantly, different participants clearly have different understand
expectations regarding participatory processes. Their understandings and expectations relate to 
their own views on the desirability for implementing public participation and to their views o
the process o
well as power relations. The multiple views that exist should be ta
study work. 
4  Common framework re
As part of the work package 1, three framework papers (Task 1.1)
senior researchers in GoverNat to identify revisions and elaborations to the framework: The 
framework papers included the following: 
1.  European governance of natural resources: institutions, scales and biodiversity, by
Gouldson, Tatiana Kluvankova
2
resources, by Felix Rauschmayer, Augustin Berghöfer, Ines Omann and Dimitrios Zikos; 
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context describing natural resources management. As the first step, 
oncrete multi-level activities in water and biodiversity governance can be systematically 
ed for 
t 
ed below. A few other minor modifications concerning the conceptual 
understanding of MLG in the analysis step, as well as a few additional questions in the 
sm rk is presented in Figure 3. The 
 
overNat 
 takes place. When 
tionalism, it is 
mework to better account for cultural 
 with four 
 of rules; 
civil society generates the values that underlie choices; 
.g. 
tes and legitimacy, even though these cannot be excluded a priori. To 




values that from the outside seem outdated or inappropriate, e.g. the theory of prolonged value 
In the light of these framework papers, as well as the findings of the consultations and the CEE 
report presented above, it is possible to reflect on the GoverNat framework as it was originally 
presented in the DoW. 
 
The original GoverNat framework outlined in DoW consisted of two parts: those of analys
evaluation, each integrating a theoretical and empirical step. The framework combines concepts
from economics, sociology, political and legal sciences and the humanities, building on 
knowledge of the ecological 
c
characterised using the analysis part of the framework. In the second step, the outcomes of the 
activities can be evaluated against criteria representing the main challenges of multilevel 
environmental governance.  
 
This two-step procedure facilitates a systematic and comparative structuring and comparison of a 
wide range of different activities in MLG. This basic framework structure will be retain
use in the subsequent work packages. Minor rewordings etc. in the terminology are generally no
discussed. However, the change from ‘evaluation’ to ‘assessment’ in the second part of the 
framework will be explain
asses ent part, are also needed. The slightly revised framewo
reasons for the needed revisions are explained below for the analysis and assessment parts of the
framework, respectively. 
4.1  Analysis of MLG of natural resources 
From the findings of the consultations and the CEE report it appears that the existing G
framework gives insufficient attention to culture as the context in which MLG
revisiting the scientific origin of the analysis part of the framework, structural func
clear that there are also theoretical reasons to modify the fra
factors. Structural functionalism conceptualises modern society as a system
subsystems, each of which fulfils a function of the whole system (Figure 2):  
  political system maintains order through the setting and enforcement
 
  economic system produces and distributes needed goods and services 
  cultural system gives meaning to human experiences. Its subsystem, the knowledge system, 
is particularly relevant for MLG of natural resources (see Figure 2). 
 
The cultural system is the missing system which needs to be added to the Table 1 of the 
GoverNat framework. It is not the function of this framework to suggest causal relationships e
between resource attribu
e
framework. Within GoverNat some of these detailed studies are performed by the fellows in their 
individual research projects. The framework links these research projects together into a one 
comprehensive picture. 
 
The GoverNat framework also alerts the fellows to the repercussions of actions in one system
the other systems, and helps to choose appropriate theories for the question under investigation.
For GoverNat this is the assessment of participation in MLG. The framework indicates that the 
observed pattern of behaviour in participatory processes may be economic, cultural, societal 
political in nature. A specific cultural theory is needed to explain strong alliance to a set of 
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ory of cognitive dissonance). These 
eories are presented here just as examples only – the range of relevant theories is much greater. 
The 
and suggest an appropriate e
Figure 2: The four basic (sub)systems including means of dealing with conflicts and 
assessment criteria (from Renn 2008) 
 
 
ant to acknowledge that there are 
ifferent perspectives based on interest, values and purpose (scientific truth claims may be one of 
wing 
e has a superior status in 
participatory processes compared with the ways people value their environment or the economic 
benefit that can be gained from nature. In any participatory process, all four systems are 
interacting, and it is therefore important to recognise each of them.  
commitments or Cultural Theory. For other behavioural observations one can choose economic
theories (e.g. rational choice) or social theories (e.g. the
th
overall frame can help to locate the cause-effect relationship within or between the boxes 
xplanatory theory to test.  
 
 
Structural Functionalism does not identify a distinct ‘natural system’. The natural system or 
environment is represented through perceptions and actions by humans in each of the four 
systems (Table 1). In a participatory setting it is import
d
them). Collaborative policy analysis begins by acknowledging that multiple ways of kno
exist and need to be incorporated into policy making.  
 
Putting a separate natural system into the conceptualisation would assume that nature is 
objectively knowable. This is in contradiction with the basic idea of the existence of different 
views or different ways of knowing which is captured by the Structural Functionalism 













Table 1: Representation of nature in the four functional systems 
 
System  representation through ... 
Expert System  expertise about nature or other phenomena 
Civil Society  values attached to and feelings about nature 
Economic System  economic value of nature (monetary or non-monetary)  
Political System  policies and laws on nature 
 
While the natural system is not represented at the same level as the four societal subsystems in 
the revised GoverNat framework, it has been added as an oval shape in the background to 
indicate that the MLG of natural resources is the main concern and one of the common 
connectors of the project. 
4.2  Assessment of MLG of natural resources 
In the GoverNat framework, evaluation or assessment, as it is proposed to be called from now 
on, relates to the processes through which MLG is established. In the GoverNat framework 
(Figure 3 & Table 2), these processes are evaluated according to four general criteria which 
originate in Structural Functionalism. In Structural Functionalism, each system has its own 
focus, rules and a way of operating. Each system uses a different criterion for assessment: 
efficiency, acceptance, effectiveness and legitimacy, respectively (Figure 2). These four 
assessment criteria have been elaborated into assessment questions relevant to the GoverNat 
context in Table 2 of the GoverNat framework. Efficiency is evaluated in the subheading ‘costs 
and efficiency’, acceptance in ‘social dynamics and civil society’, effectiveness’ in ‘complexity, 
information and governance culture’ and legitimacy in ‘legitimacy and politics’. 
 
MLG processes are a form of linking two or more systems in order to solve societal problems. 
The study and assessment of MLG processes should therefore take all four subsystems into 
account, because they are always present in some mixture. For example, the European 
Commission in its description of good governance uses and combines similar criteria called 
‘universal principles’: ‘openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. 
Each principle is important for establishing more democratic governance […]. They apply to all 
levels of government – global, European, national, regional and local’ (European Commission 
2001).  
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Figure 3: GoverNat revised framework 
 
 
While this indicates that the criteria for the assessment of a MLG process can be easily 
established using the concepts of Structural Functionalism, the determination of the detailed 
questions with which to evaluate these criteria is less straightforward. Any type of decision 
making – be it participatory or conventional – needs to address two major aspects: what and 
whom to include on the one hand (inclusion) and what and how to select (closure) on the other 
hand. Classic decision analysis has been offering formal methods for generating options to 
perform these two basic tasks and to evaluate these options on a set of predefined criteria (von 
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Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). However, with the advent of MLG in general and new 
participatory methods in particular, the issues of inclusion and selection have become more 
complex and sophisticated compared to the conventional strategies of decision analysis.  
 
What is evaluated as good or bad governance is crucially affected by the selected assessment 
criteria. They should take into account at the same time the specific institutional context and the 
specific problem constellation (Knill 2004). Also, good governance is very much dependent on 
values and cultural norms of the society, its political history, its desired social and economic 
outcomes (Abrams et al. 2003). Therefore, in a specific case, it remains difficult to determine the 
quality of governance. 
 
The foregoing discussion has major implications for the assessment of a MLG process. The 
implications concern two choices that need to be made when evaluating a MLG process: whether 
to value good inclusion over good closure or vice versa, and whether to apply general criteria or 
adjust the assessment according to local circumstances. These choices are examined and 
discussed below, and the GoverNat position is explained subsequently. 
4.2.1  Outcome-oriented vs. procedural assessment 
With respect to the first dilemma, the literature on participation opens a wide range of answers to 
the two major challenges of inclusion and closure. Some participation models restrict the 
boundaries of inclusion for being more efficient in reaching closure; they focus on outcome-
oriented assessment of the process. Other place most emphasis on inclusion and hope that some 
kind of closure will follow once all viewpoints have been represented; they focus on procedural 
assessment. It is clear however, that choices will have to be made regarding priorities. Achieving 
all five goals set by the European Commission ‘openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence’ at once and equally well is an illusion in practice. Some of these 
criteria such as accountability can be understood in each of these two perspectives: who is 
accountable for the process? Does the output of the process state clearly who is accountable for 
the implementation? Is the accountability effective?  
 
In GoverNat, most evaluative questions in the framework (Table 2) have been formulated using 
the process oriented approach. Good processes supposedly contribute to good governance in 
different ways. One argument is that a good process is instrumental for a good implementation of 
the output: legitimate processes have better chances to have their results accepted. Others argue 
that good processes improve the substantial quality of the output, through more and better 
information management and learning effects within the process. The third argument, reinforced 
by the Aarhus Convention, focuses on the normative aim of certain characteristics of governance 
processes, such as openness, participation, and so on. All three arguments are present in the 
literature on environmental governance and participatory processes (e.g. Stirling 2006).  
 
The term ‘outcome’ is employed to distinguish from ‘process’ and it comprises all tangible 
results of the process. The outcome of a governance process can be analysed with regard to its 
direct outputs and to the assumed consequences of such outputs, in terms of changes in the 
system-to-be-governed. Outputs refer to the measures taken, e.g. the development of a 
management plan, the adoption of a set of regulations or the hiring of more staff, and the like. 
Consequences describe how the environmental state has changed due to the measures, or what 
direct impacts on society these changes have shown. 
 
Outcome-oriented analysis is a widely accepted approximation for assessing environmental 
policies and governance processes. This form of assessment is often applied within the DPSIR 
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analytical framework (Maxim et al., forthcoming; Smeets and Weterings 1999; Gabrielsen and 
Bosch 2003). The DPSIR framework is used by organisations dealing with sustainability issues 
such as the European Environmental Agency, by EUROSTAT and also by researchers working 
in this field. It is attractive because it focuses on supposed causal relationships in a clear way 
herewith appealing to policy actors (Smeets and Weterings 1999; Giupponi 2005). Secondly, the 
framework allows distinguishing between different policy options by locating them (and their 
respective indicators) along the virtual cycle of driver – pressure – state – impact – response. 
 
Despite the widespread use of this approach, two main challenges for the outcome-oriented 
assessment of governance processes can be identified. The first challenge refers to causal 
linkages which need to be assumed, while the second challenge refers to the ex-post character of 
outcome evaluation. The first challenge results from uncertainty. Often, we cannot count on a 
clear explanatory link between the adopted measure and the new state in the system-to-be-
governed (Conley and Moote 2003). To give a hypothetical example, it frequently escapes our 
understanding whether a growing forest cover within a protected area is the result of (i) a sound 
management plan which is closely adhered to, (ii) a poor management plan which is luckily not 
given a lot of consideration, (iii) a reduction in external land use pressures, or (iv) some twist in 
the population dynamics of the bark beetle.  
 
The second main challenge for outcome assessment is the ex-post character of this approach. 
Long term impacts can only be seen after many years. Waiting that long to evaluate a 
governance process might produce learning effects only too late. For example, the 
implementation of protected areas (as in the Natura 2000 network) takes place in the context of 
continuous biodiversity loss which requires rapid action in terms of adaptive management. This 
management is based on timely, albeit preliminary information. In the context of GoverNat this 
latter challenge of course also means a pragmatic constraint in the sense that it will not be 
possible to evaluate the outcomes of directives that have only relatively recently been adopted. 
The outcome-related question in the framework is therefore bound to the process itself, in that 
the assessment framework asks whether potential outcomes of the process have been considered 
sufficiently. The question in the original framework directly referring to outcomes (heading 
‘complexity and information’: what are the environmental outcomes of altered management 
options and governance structures’) has been reformulated in the revised framework to make the 
evaluation independent from the time lap between the process and eventual outcomes. It now is 
formulated as follows: ‘Were expected outcomes of altered management options and governance 
structures taken into account? Were they effective?’. 
4.2.2  General vs. local criteria for assessment 
With respect to the second dilemma identified above, that of general vs. local assessment criteria, 
there are two main sources for the assessment criteria of a good participatory decision process 
(Abelson and Gauvin 2006):  
1.  philosophical discussions on discourse ethics (Habermas 1991; Webler 1995), deliberative 
democracy (Cooke 2000), and pluralist approaches (Bader and Engelen 2003). These 
approaches claim moral validity of the theoretically deduced criteria throughout all cases; 
and  
2.  views of participants (Webler and Tuler 2006; Webler et al. 2001), challenging a universally 
valid view through empirical observations that participants have very different ideas of what 
constitutes a good process. 
 
The advent of MLG has made the assessment of decision making processes less clear-cut. 
Ideally, a process is evaluated according to its purpose, whether this was process or outcome-
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oriented. However, this purpose may be different for different participants. Ultimately this means 
that a process can only be evaluated by taking a particular perspective or concept (the second 
point above). Universal criteria for evaluating participation are then not feasible: evaluative 
criteria need to be shaped and selected in accordance with the underlying concept in use. The 
diversity of concepts and background philosophies is one of the reasons why participatory 
processes are so difficult to evaluate in terms of overarching evaluative criteria (Tuler and 
Webler 1995; Rowe and Frewer 2000; Rowe et al. 2004). Although some of these models can be 
combined and integrated, there are at least differences in priorities.  
 
However, there can also be a meta-level of assessment (the first point above). There are two 
ways to do this. One is to look for assessment criteria that all actors agree on. In this way the 
subjective view of all obtains objective status, at least in the process evaluated. The other 
solution is to explicitly state normative assumptions, such as ‘a fair process should include all 
those who are affected by a decision’. This is what the GoverNat framework does: it asks 
questions from a specific normative standpoint, which is inspired by literature on deliberative 
democracy. Deliberative citizen participation is mainly influenced by Habermasian discourse 
theory (Habermas 1984, 1987; Apel 1992; Benhabib 1992; Brulle 1992; Webler 1995; Cohen 
1997; Renn and Webler 1998).  
 
Discourse theory and discourse ethics advocate more inclusiveness for legitimate and sustainable 
political decision-making. Modern societies are characterized by a plurality of values and world 
views. According to Habermas (1996), conventional politics and political decision-making 
cannot deal with this heterogeneity adequately because modern societies lack moral cohesion 
that could guide political decision-making. Habermasian discourse ethics offers a solution to this 
dilemma. In discourse ethics, only those political and judicial decisions may claim to be 
legitimate that may find the consent of all affected parties in discursive opinion formation and 
decision making processes (Habermas 1992; Corrigan and Joyce 1997). Accordingly, legitimate 
political opinion formation is conceptualized as a process of the competition of arguments. As a 
result, the procedure of decision-making decides on its legitimacy. This view on assessment of 
decision making processes theory is therefore also process-oriented as well as choosing the 
normative position of legitimacy through deliberation.  
4.2.3  Assessment in practice 
The goal of the ‘functionalist’ participation (Renn 2008) is to improve political decision making 
in general and public policies in particular. Functionalist decision making is oriented towards the 
achievement of pre-defined goals. This is pursued through synthesizing knowledge and values. 
This goal can be instrumental in the sense that the best available solution is crafted and selected 
or strategic in order to smooth the process of implementation by giving all relevant stakeholders 
the opportunity to be part of the process and ease their potential opposition. In terms of the basic 
functions of society as outlined above, the model is designed to improve and enhance the 
effectiveness of decision making and implementation. It assumes that representation and 
inclusion of diversity will result in improved environmental policy making with respect to the 
quality of the decisions made and/or ease their implementation. These two factors are also the 
assessment criteria in a functionalist approach. It can be concluded from the consultations that a 
functionalist principle is in practice dominant in the perspectives of the instigators of MLG 
processes: the focus of the assessment is concentrated on the outcomes, and especially on those 
measurable criteria (limits, technical and administrative issues etc).  
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It follows that one challenge for GoverNat will be to solve this tension between the goals of the 
instigators of MLG processes and the assessment criteria set by the framework, which are based 
upon different principles. 
5  Emerging research programme 
The revised GoverNat research framework will be mobilised particularly in case studies of MLG 
of water and biodiversity governance where scale effects and interplay are of special importance. 
For instance, social and legal legitimacy of a decision (Table 2 in Figure 3) depends on the 
actors’ scope for decision making contingent on their position on the political scale. The 
GoverNat partners also examine how spatial, temporal and issue-related openness of multi-level 
governance solutions is related to social dynamics. Finally, analysing the relative costs of 
governance solutions is of significant importance as water and biodiversity administrations are 
systematically underfunded. For example, for the GoverNat praxis host SRNAP, managing a 
Slovakian national park, the government funding does not cover even 10% of the actions and 
objectives in the management plan.  
 
GoverNat case studies will be used to perform the tasks mentioned in Work Packages 2 to 5. 
They will also be the basis for more detailed research performed by the fellows. Their individual 
research projects deal with the interactions between the four subsystems of society as 
conceptualised by Structural Functionalism. Structural Functionalism is too broad to derive 
precise causal hypotheses. While the GoverNat framework may suggests to some that there are 
causal if not deterministic and/or universal relationships between Table 1 and Table 2, this is not 
the intention, as has been explained in section 4.2.  
 
In their detailed research, the fellows will focus primarily on one interaction while not omitting 
to pay attention to the whole system. The individual interests can be roughly mapped onto 
Structural Functionalism’s conceptual framework (Figure 4). As a package of research projects, 
the fellows’ choices reflect the importance of the political system in MGL of natural resources. 
All fellows study the interaction with or within the political subsystem. Their research topics are 
outlined in Table 2 and Table 3 below.  
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Table 2: Main research topics of the doctoral Marie Curie fellows 
 
UFZ  Leipzig  Germany  Does distribution matter? Distributional aspects of watershed 
protection in Europe. 
ECOMAN  Lisbon  Portugal  The role of regional social networks in multi-level water 
governance. 
NERI Roskilde  Denmark  The  Europeanization of national water politics. Institutional 
change and public participation in four EU member states. 
SRI  Leeds  UK  The problem of fit and the costs of multilevel governance of 
biodiversity in Europe. 
UAB-ICTA 
Barcelona 
Spain  How do interfaces between European biodiversity research and 
stakeholders contribute to halting biodiversity loss? 
CSWM Lancaster  UK  The democratic legitimacy of water governance processes. 
UStutt Stuttgart  Germany  Boundaries of knowledge in biodiversity governance. Volunteer 
naturalists in focus.  
SAV Bratislava  Slovak 
Rep. 
Institutional changes in biodiversity governance in countries of 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE). 
IELM-SIU Gödöllö  Hungary  Biodiversity governance in Hungarian national parks. 
 
 
Table 3: Main research topics of the experienced Marie Curie fellows 
 
UFZ Leipzig  Germany  Translating theory into practice in a multi-level European context. 
SRI  Leeds  UK  Policy needs for participation in multi-level governance for 
biodiversity and water in Europe. 
SAV Bratislava  Slovak 
Rep. 
The impact of different environmental governance structures on 
innovation and learning.  
 
 
Figure 4: GoverNat fellows’ individual research projects mapped onto the Structural 










































6  Training and other implications  
In the light of Structural Functionalism that is a key to understanding the GoverNat framework 
with which the fellows will be working, training to attain a basic understanding of this theory 
was organised during the summer school in Lisbon in January 2008. The fellows also identified a 
need to have an overview of the available theories in key social science disciplines to explain the 
functioning of the separate social subsystems recognised by Structural Functionalism, as well the 
interactions between the systems. This training was organised by the fellows and took place in 
Århus, 5-10 April 2008. At the training some time was also spent on the topic of ‘doing 
interdisciplinary research’. 
 
A further addition to the training programme in light of the findings of this report is scheduled to 
take place towards the end of the GoverNat project, most likely in conjunction with the last 
workshop (month 31). This exchange will be focussing on interdisciplinary methods to combine 
the outputs of the fellows’ individual research projects into a comprehensive understanding of 
multi-level governance of natural resources. 
7  Conclusions  
The work undertaken in the Work Package 1 suggests that GoverNat is well placed to produce 
the innovative interdisciplinary results it set out to deliver. Consultations, the CEE report and 
framework papers have suggested some relatively minor modifications to the original framework 
which improve the fine-tuning of the research effort and help to rationalize ex post some of 
aspects of the framework as it was originally conceived. In addition, they have suggested 
specific questions for research to be undertaken by the fellows. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the review and refinement work undertaken as part of the work 
package 1 has highlighted the important role of culture and history in multilevel environmental 
governance. These contextual factors were not given sufficient weight in the original formulation 
of the GoverNat framework in the DoW. The resulting revisions to the GoverNat research 
framework fully acknowledge the political, economic and cultural embeddedness of multi-level 
environmental governance solutions.  
 
Secondly, work package 1 has identified the challenge in assessing participatory / governance 
arrangements using broad set of criteria when the key involved stakeholders and actors only 
attribute narrow set of performance expectations to it. The observation highlights the importance 
of inclusive material collection, analysis and other research practices so as to account for 
divergent interpretations and expectations regarding participation in multi-level environmental 
governance. This is particularly important because the actors representing public administration 
consider their interactions with other actors from public administration among the key challenges 
of multilevel environmental governance in Europe. 
 
The emerging research programme based on the individual research plans of GoverNat Early 
Stage Researchers covers different aspects of the GoverNat research framework in a very 
satisfactory way, and maps well to the revised research framework. The identified need for a 
more meta-theoretical training in social sciences have already been largely met with an 
additional training programme organized by the fellows in April 2008 in Aarhus. Remaining 
training needs in interdisciplinary research methodologies to ensure transfer of lessons is 
scheduled to take place towards the end of the GoverNat project. 
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Annex: Guideline for conducting WP1 consultations  
 
The rationale of collating short written summaries of consultations is to collect a documentary 
material that enables us to make grounded judgements regarding the research priorities that we 
ought to set to ourselves and to our trainees, as set out in the DoW. 
 
In the kick-off meeting it was concluded that the role of consultations is to make sure that we are 
aware of the current priorities and issues that stakeholders have with regard to governance of 
biodiversity and water in Europe. Meetings with representatives of stakeholders and discussions 
with them in events etc. are all valid instances of consultation. The point is to report these 
discussions so that we can build a record on them. 
 
A one-page reporting form or guideline is presented below for recording the details of 
consultations and their key content. Consultation reports should be emailed to me 
(j.paavola@see.leeds.ac.uk) and copied to coordinators (coord.governat@ufz.de) whenever a 
consultation has been completed and the report drafted. I suggest the issues to be included are: 
 
1. Consultation identifiers 
1.1 Consulted stakeholder group and description of its role / position 
1.2 Date, time and place 
1.3 Involved people (stakeholder and GoverNat representatives) 
 
2. Substantive issues 
2.1 Consultee’s positive and negative personal experiences from multi-level 
environmental governance. Describe in particular the multi-level nature of the problem 
and any interactions and conflicts between levels 
2.2. Consultee’s views on the role of participation in his or her field of activity: who has 
participated (e.g. what stakeholders, was the general public involved) and to which 
degree (e.g. consultation, actual planning)? How has participation been useful or harmful 
in his or her opinion? Please ask justifications and rationalisations for the views. 
2.3 Consultee’s views on the current priorities and challenges with regard to the 
governance of biodiversity and/or water? 
2.4 Consultee’s views on the future priorities and challenges with regard to the 
governance of biodiversity and/or water? 
2.5 Consultee’s involvement and awareness of related projects etc. 
2.6 Consultee’s suggestions for case study sites / topics / issues 
 
 